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The display name was whatever I said it was

Three behaviours that were fine on their own. The argument that got it accepted wasn't about severity, it was about scope.

Auth · 3 min read

An employee HR portal embedded a hosted live-chat widget. The public, unauthenticated page that loads the widget also publishes every identifier the chat backend needs: org id, widget id, backend URL. That's not a leak, it's how the widget bootstraps.

From those identifiers, anonymously:

GET /livechatconnector/v4/getchattoken/{orgId}/{widgetId}/{random-uuid} HTTP/2
Host: <tenant>.<chat-vendor>.com

HTTP/2 200 OK
{"ChatId":"19:acsV2_…@thread.v2","Token":"eyJ…","ExpiresIn":"86399", …}

A 24-hour token, and a live session now sitting in the company's support queue. Then, straight against the vendor's chat API:

POST /chat/threads/{ChatId}/messages HTTP/2
Authorization: Bearer eyJ…

{"content":"…","type":"text","senderDisplayName":"HR Support Agent"}

201 Created. The agent's console renders that display name verbatim.

None of those three is a bug#

This is the part worth slowing down on, because it's where I nearly threw the finding away.

Anonymous token issuance is by design. The whole point of a website chat widget is that a visitor who has never logged in can start a conversation. An endpoint that mints an anonymous session token without credentials is the feature.

The token working directly against the chat REST API is also by design. It's a normal bearer token for a normal documented API. I'm not bypassing anything by using it outside the widget.

senderDisplayName in the request body is the bug. It's supplied by the caller and never reconciled against the identity in the token. The token's subject is an anonymous user with no name attached, so there is nothing to contradict. Whatever string I send is what the human agent sees, with no indicator in the UI that it was caller-supplied rather than identity-derived.

So: an anonymous person can place messages attributed to "HR Support Agent", "IT Security Team" or a named colleague into a live employee support conversation.

Check the boring explanation first

Two of those three behaviours are a product working correctly. If I'd written the report around "the token endpoint needs no authentication" it would have been closed as by-design in a sentence, and correctly. The finding only exists because one field in the chain isn't validated.

The scope fight#

Triage pushed back immediately, and reasonably: that host belongs to the chat vendor, not to us. Third-party infrastructure. Out of scope.

That objection is usually right, and it quietly kills a lot of real findings on SaaS-heavy targets. I had two replies drafted in the folder — one arguing it was in scope, one withdrawing the report. I came close to sending the withdrawal.

What worked was dropping the "your vendor has a bug" framing entirely. Three moves:

  1. Show the in-scope asset loading it. Paste the actual <script> tag from the in-scope page, with the org and widget ids visible in its attributes. Not a description of the integration — the tag.
  2. Show every input came from the in-scope asset. Each identifier in the repro was read off that public page. Nothing was obtained from the vendor, guessed, or carried in from another target.
  3. Locate the defect in the tenant's configuration, not the vendor's code. Anonymous chat was switched on for this deployment, and the display name was never constrained. Both are the customer's settings on their own instance.

That last one is the sentence that moves it. "Your vendor has a vulnerability" is someone else's report. "Your configuration of your vendor exposes your employees" is this program's report, and it is also just true.

What to check on any embedded widget#

Outcome#

Filed as High, chaining all three. Accepted as Medium, no bounty — it's a disclosure programme.

One more thing, and it's the reason I went back to this at all. My own notes recorded this report as withdrawn, out of scope, final disposition unverified, and sat that way for over a month. The platform record said Accepted. I'd been carrying a wrong number in my own ledger because I wrote down what I expected to happen instead of checking what did.

The platform is the ledger. Your notes are a guess.